Information provided by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security regarding potential terrorist attacks significantly affects the U.S. equity market. When the government raises the perceived threat level, investors' perceptions of risk increase (as measured by the conditional volatility of returns and implied volatility on S&P 500 Index options), but these responses have declined monotonically over time. We also find evidence that informed traders are more active when there is an increased threat of an attack. Thus, the perceived threat of terrorism can affect both equity volatility and the information content of trades but not necessarily the level of aggregate returns. 1 Important examples of "Knightian" uncertainty can be found in Keynes ' (1921, 1936) rationale for "animal spirits" in financial markets (i.e., the effect of non-fundamental, psychological factors on asset prices) and the "Ellsberg Paradox" (1961). In particular, Ellsberg (1961) shows that people typically violate the basic properties of Savagetype (1954) expected utility functions. Ellsberg's experiment demonstrated that people are "uncertainty averse" because they prefer to play games of chance in which there are known probabilities and avoid games in which the probabilities are not known. See Epstein and Wang (1994), Basili (2006) for further examples of the effects of Knightian uncertainty on asset prices, market "crashes," violations of put-call parity, the thinness of markets, and the bid-ask spread.
structure of financial markets. Interestingly, the effects of uncertainty on asset prices and market structure exist even when investors can quantify the probabilities of most, but not all, possible future states of the economy.
One can view the increased possibility of global terrorist activity at the beginning of the 21st century as a worldwide increase in Knightian uncertainty. Coupled with the fundamental concept that systematic and (possibly) nonsystematic risks can affect asset prices and the risk-return relationship, it is important to understand how greater uncertainty affects both of these forms of risk.
The recent evolution of terrorism from primarily a regional phenomenon to an international problem makes it difficult for investors to diversify some of these risks on a global scale. At the same time, the ability of investors to estimate the financial impact of future terrorist activity is severely tested in this environment. However, investors must still try to manage portfolio exposure to systematic risk through judicious asset allocation or the use of hedging instruments. Analyzing the effects of terrorism uncertainty on financial risks is particularly difficult for investors because specific details regarding possible impending attacks are not well known outside of national security circles (or at all).
In light of the above issues, the U.S. government disseminates as much information as possible, to the extent that releasing the information will not interfere with ongoing surveillance and terror attack preventative measures. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) threat level announcement system is the conduit to pass potential terror attack activity to the public. If DHS is effectively analyzing and communicating increases or decreases in terrorist attack threat levels, then changes in systematic and nonsystematic risks associated with these threat levels should be reflected in the mean and/or higher moments of equity returns. In addition to the impact on risk perceptions, the degree of informed trading present in financial markets might be affected by DHS terror alerts and, thus, spur more trading by better-informed market participants.
Using announced changes in terrorism threat levels from the DHS Homeland Security Advisory System, we estimate the impact of perceived terrorism uncertainty on daily equity returns, conditional volatility of returns, implied volatility (proxied by the CBOE Volatility Index, VIX), and the probability of informed trading (PIN). We find strong, robust evidence that increases in the threat level positively affect both conditional and implied volatility. However, the magnitude of these effects has declined monotonically since 2002. The increases in both conditional and implied volatility also suggest that the short-term adjustment to changes in the terror threat level is not trivial, as investors try to alter their portfolios quickly, based on any relevant information gleaned from the terror alert system. Contrary to the results related to volatility, the level of aggregate stock returns responds inconsistently to changes in the advisory system and, at times, with unexpected signs. For example, we find that announcements of increases in the general threat condition are negatively related to airline stock returns (as proxied by the AMEX Airline Index), while the S&P 500 Index responds positively to increases in the threat level. Overall, the mixed and generally weak relationship between changes in the threat level and daily equity returns indicates that investors might be able to adjust their portfolios in ways that neutralize most of the potentially negative short-term effects of these terror alerts (albeit with the side effect of heightened volatility). 2 We also find that our measure of the probability of informed trading (Easley, Kiefer, O'Hara, and Paperman's "PIN," 1996) is positively related to increases in the terrorism threat level. That is, PIN is shown to be consistently higher during periods when the advisory system warns of high, or severe, risk of a terrorist attack. This suggests that investors with superior information (i.e., betterinformed traders) take advantage of the heightened uncertainty and greater volatility because these traders' presence in the U.S. equity market rises simultaneously with each increase in the terror threat level. This finding is consistent with Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) , which shows that informed traders are likely to trade during periods of greater trading volatility by attempting to "hide" their trades and profit from their informational advantage. Thus, the perceived threat of terrorism affects both the volatility of equities and the informational content of trades in the U.S. (i.e., the alerts coincide with increased trading activity by informed traders which, in turn, can lead to moreinformative prices, as other investors observe and learn from this trading activity).
In sum, we contribute to the literature in three ways. First, we show that, when terrorism uncertainty affects financial risk (as measured by conditional volatility and implied volatility), changes in perceived threat levels can influence asset prices, sometimes in unexpected ways.
Second, this study is the first to report that the time variation in conditional and implied volatility measures are significantly affected by changes in terrorist threat levels. Lastly, the paper presents the first investigation of potential relations between PIN and the Homeland Security Advisory System's announced threat level. Overall, the U.S. equity market appears to respond fairly well to sudden increases in Knightian uncertainty caused by a greater threat of terrorist activity. For example, investors seem to react rationally to this increased uncertainty by adjusting their portfolios to protect against any potentially negative effects from a heightened threat of terrorist activity. In addition, informed traders respond logically to the terror-induced greater volatility by using this opportunity to trade more actively.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section I details the Homeland Security Advisory System. Section II reviews the literature, while Section III discusses the methodology.
Section IV provides empirical estimates, and Section V offers policy and portfolio management implications. Section VI provides our conclusions and suggestions for future research.
I. The Homeland Security Advisory System
On March 12, 2002, Tom Ridge, the former governor of Pennsylvania and the first secretary of DHS, announced the creation of the Homeland Security Advisory System. This system was devised to protect U.S. cities, resources, and people from the threat of terrorism. The system is designed to "measure and evaluate terrorist threats and communicate them to the public in a timely manner."
3 The end goal of the advisory system is to make America safer and more aware of the threat of terrorism through timely communications to the general public.
The attorney general of the United States at the time, John Ashcroft, said information is the best friend of prevention. Given that terrorist activities (such as the September 11, 2001, attacks on the U.S.) may affect economic growth, any information helping to prevent such an attack can have economic value and, therefore, possibly affect asset prices.
The Homeland Security Advisory System comprises five threat conditions or alert levels:
low, guarded, elevated, high, and severe. Each threat level is represented by a color: green, blue, yellow, orange, and red, respectively. Since the introduction of the threat advisory system, one Table I provides the threat level, whether the threat level was increased or decreased, the threat target, the reason for the change in threat level, and information regarding the threat situation.
Since the introduction of the terror alert system, DHS has changed the terror alert level on 16
occasions. The only announcement of severe (red) risk of terrorist activities occurred on August 10, 2006, in response to possible airline attacks originating from the United Kingdom. In that instance, {Insert Table I } DHS stated that an attack employing liquid explosives had been thwarted. Consequently, the threat level was lowered a few days later on August 13, 2006.
II. Related Work
The growing interest regarding the economic costs resulting from terrorist activities has spawned new lines of academic research. Mooney, Zuber, Grandar, and Lamb (2006) and Karakas (2007) use event studies to examine the impact of changes in threat levels on asset prices. These two papers both focus on the level of equity prices and find that changes in threat levels have no effect on the prices of domestic and foreign-based airlines, insurance companies, and broader stock market measures. We extend this research by showing, contrary to previous studies, that, if uncertainty influences financial risk measures, such as conditional volatility and implied volatility, then changes in threat levels may impact asset prices.
Motivation for our analysis can also be found in recent research on the influence of terrorism on economic activity. These studies find short-run negative macroeconomic effects associated with acts of terrorism. , (y t -R f ) is the daily excess return on each respective index at time-t, and h t is the conditional variance. We include variables to capture the separate (and possibly asymmetric) effects of increases and decreases in the threat level on equity returns. Gen_Incr is a dummy variable equal to one on trading days when the general terror alert status was increased, while Gen_Decr is a dummy variable set to one on trading days when the general terror alert status was decreased and γ 1 = 1. Industry-specific dummy variables are also included, separating increases from decreases based on three specific industries that have been highlighted in some of the terror alert announcements: the financial services, mass transit, and In the above specification, the parameter estimates for β 5 through β 12 are of particular importance because they capture the marginal effects of changes in terror alert levels, based on their general direction (e.g., increases versus decreases), as well as the specific industries that might be most adversely affected by terrorist activity. Table IV presents empirical estimates that we discuss later in Section V.
Beyond the return-related models noted above, we also investigate the impact of changes in the perceived threat level on volatility expectations using the CBOE Volatility Index (VIX). An AR(1) model with a specific event window and annual dummy variables are used to model fluctuations in the VIX volatility measure, also referred to as the "fear index" in the business media.
Numerous windows surrounding each change in the terror threat level are estimated based on where, Incr M and Decr N represent event-specific dummy variables that equal one when the threat level increases (decreases) on, or close to, trading day-M (-N), and Incr2003 -Incr2006 and (2) Decr2003-Decr2006 denote annual time dummies that equal one when the threat level increases or decreases during a particular year, respectively.
We check for diminishing marginal effects of increase/decrease announcements by including annual dummy variables for all years following 2002. As no macro-terrorism events have immediately followed an increase in the threat level, investors may have begun to question the quality of the information contained in terror alert announcements. In other words, investors may believe the Department of Homeland Security has been "crying wolf." Alternatively, but with the same result, investors may simply have become complacent, believing that the U.S. government is effectively preventing terrorist attacks but still alerts the public in case an attack cannot be thwarted.
Yet another argument, based on investor rationality, indicates that the alerts have less significance in later periods because investors have already adjusted their expectations earlier in 2002 to reflect a more uncertain world in which terrorism risk remains heightened for the foreseeable future.
If the DHS alert system effectively communicates new information regarding the possibility of a terrorist attack, then those investors with superior information (i.e., informed traders) might trade more actively following these announcements. To estimate the likelihood of information-based trading in a specific set of stock indexes, we compute the probability of informed trading (PIN) described in Easley et al. (1996) . This model relies upon the notion that trading results from a) the submission of market buy and sell orders by a large number of traders, and b) some of these trades are from potentially informed traders. 7 The appendix provides details on the PIN model of Easley et al. (1996) , while Table VI in Section IV.D. reports the empirical results based on this technique.
C. Hypotheses
To summarize the implications of the above models, we present below a set of 12 testable hypotheses. Both the null and alternative hypotheses are displayed in order to facilitate the analysis of our empirical results later in Section IV. As can be seen from this summary, Hypotheses 1-4 examine whether any changes in the threat level affect equity returns and volatility, while Equity returns do not respond to decreases in threat levels Equity returns positively respond to decreases in threat levels Table II  2 Equity returns do not respond to increases in threat levels Equity returns negatively respond to decreases in threat levels Table II  3 Returns volatility do not respond to decreases in threat levels Returns volatility do respond to decreases in threat levels Table II  4 Returns volatility do not respond to increases in threat levels Returns volatility do respond to increases in threat levels Table II  5 Conditional variance is not related to returns Conditional variance is positively related to returns Table III 
Change from Gen. to Specific threats does not affect the returns process Change from Gen. to Specific threats do affect the returns process Table III 
Announcements of increased threat levels do not affect returns Announcements of increased threat levels negatively affect returns Table III 
Announcements of decreased threat levels do not affect returns Announcements of decreased threat levels positively affect returns Table III 
Changes to threat levels do not affect volatility expectations Threat level increases/decreases raise/lower volatility expectations Table IV 
Responses to increases in threat levels stay the same in 2002 Responses to increases in threat levels decline monotonically Table IV 
Responses to decreases in threat levels stay the same in 2002 Responses to decreases in threat levels decline monotonically Table IV β 8 = β 9 = β 10 = β 11 = 0 0 < β 8 < β 9 < β 10 < β 11 12
Threat level announcements contain no new information Threat level announcements contain new information Table V PIN at higher threat level = PIN at lower threat level PIN at higher threat level > PIN at lower threat level {Insert Table II }   Panel B of Table II provides the returns for single-event threat level changes. Mean, median, and standard deviation of returns across the seven indexes are also reported. Again, we expect that returns should be negative when perceived threat levels increase but positive when threat levels decline. Contrary to expectations, the median daily return for these indexes is positive for increased threat levels to airlines, mass transit, and financial services. Only the positive response of the indexes to a lower threat level regarding airlines is consistent with expectations. Due to the statistical insignificance of these returns relative to non-event days, the univariate statistics for daily average returns are inconclusive regarding the relationship between changes in the perceived threat of a terrorist attack and U.S. equity returns.
IV. Results

A. Univariate Results
The standard deviation of returns tells a different story: relative to days with no announcements, the standard deviation of daily returns for the S&P 500 is 70% higher when the general threat level increases (i.e., 1.71% versus 1.01% in panel A of Table II ). Ex ante, we expect that any announcements regarding perceived threat levels will induce trading and increase volatility.
To check if these differences in the standard deviation of returns are statistically significant, we present results of F-tests of the differences between standard deviations of returns on non-event days compared with higher or lower threat level days in Panel A of Table II . For five of seven indexes, standard deviations of returns are significantly higher when general threat levels increase. The average increase in volatility of returns when the general threat level was increased is approximately 43% across all seven stock indexes. 9 This evidence suggests that, while changes in the perceived threat of a terrorist attack ambiguously affect the mean of equity returns, they are likely to increase the volatility of returns, especially when perceived threat levels increase. This is our first piece of evidence that perceived threats of terrorist attacks affect systematic and nonsystematic risks. general and industry-specific threats equally. In addition, both panels report F-tests for unequal variances between non-event (NE) days and general decreases (Gen_Lower) as well as general increases (Gen_Raise).
{Insert Table III } Panel A of Table III shows that there is a significant difference at the 10% level between days when the general threat level is lowered and days when the threat level stays the same (nonevent). Consequently, we employ t-tests of differences in means assuming unequal variances. At the 1 % level of significance, the mean value of VIX on days of general decreases in the threat level (25.96%) is significantly greater than from the mean value on non-event days (17.87%).
When we include the industry-specific announcements with all general announcements in Panel B, the results become more robust. The mean VIX values on both lower-threat (21.23%) and higher-threat days (22.67%) are statistically different from non-event threat days (17.87%) at the 1% level. Thus, although these simple univariate tests do not capture the stochastic nature of volatility, they do suggest that perceived increases and decreases in the threat level affect implied volatility.
B. Effects on Conditional Volatility and Expected Returns
To examine this potential positive relationship between terror threats and conditional volatility more formally, we present in Table IV for ln(h t-1 ), and g(z t-1 ), (denoted as δ 1 and θ 1 , respectively). The direct effects of conditional volatility on daily returns are summarized by the estimates of ln(h t ), λ. Although many of the estimates of δ 1 , θ 1 and λ are statistically significant at the 1% level, the parameter signs are mixed.
10
{Insert Table IV } 10 In particular, the conditional volatility of the Bloomberg NYC Regional Stock Index and the S&P 500 are positively related to returns in excess of the risk-free rate, while excess returns of the CRSP Value-Weighted Index is negatively related to conditional volatility. Thus, the evidence on the relation between conditional volatility and daily returns is mixed. These findings are similar to prior studies investigating the relations between conditional volatility and returns.
Estimates of the potentially asymmetric effects of changes in the threat level are also presented in Table IV . For robustness, we include the Fama-French (1993) factors to control for market risk, as well as the effects related to firm size, and the book-to-market equity ratio. between threat level announcements and index returns might be driven by investors' perceptions that any change in the threat level (i.e., up or down) is "good news" for certain industries, such as the financial services industry, because it signals that the U.S. government is being proactive in its ability to prevent future attacks.
C. Effects on Implied Volatility
11 http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken french/ 12 Overall, 5 of the possible 28 responses to perceived threat level increases are significant (7 indexes times 4 categories of threat increases), including 3 negative responses and 2 positive responses. Out of the 28 possible responses to decreases in perceived threat levels, 9 are significant with 7 (2) shown to be negative (positive).
To further investigate the impact of changes in the perceived threat level on volatility expectations, we report multivariate tests using an implied volatility measure (the CBOE Volatility Index, VIX) in Table V To illustrate the decreasing responses by investors to heightened perceived threat levels, we simulate VIX using the estimates from Equation (2) and report the results of this simulation in Figure III . The prior-day volatility, VIX t-1 , is held constant at 17.92% (the average daily implied volatility over the sample period), and μ is set to zero. Initially, Incr, Decr, Incr2003, Incr2004, Incr2005, Incr2006, Decr2003, Decr2004, Decr2005 , and Decr2006 are all set to zero, and VIX is computed. Next, Incr is set to one and VIX is recomputed for several days before dropping Incr back to zero. For each following year, VIX is computed similarly, with the only difference being that the {Insert Figure III } annual interaction binary variables (Incr2003, Incr2004, etc.) are also set to one and then reset to zero during the relevant years. Consistent with the notion that Knightian uncertainty was highest right after the 9/11 attacks and then diminished as investors adjusted to the "post-9/11" environment, Figure III clearly shows the first response to the perceived threat level is the largest, and later responses are much smaller in magnitude.
D. Changes in Informed Traders' Activity
We test the null hypothesis that terror alert announcements do not affect the level of informed trading. If the government is effective in assessing terrorism risks and disseminating valuable information to the public, then we should see informed trading increase during periods of heightened threat levels, as these traders might take advantage of the greater volatility associated with these announcements by executing trades with relatively uninformed investors.
Estimates of the probability of informed trading (PIN) based on Easley et al. (1996) are presented in Table VI Taken together, the above results lead us to reject the null hypotheses described in Section III for H3-H4 and H6-H12. Thus, the rejection of these null hypotheses indicates that changes in terror threat levels a) positively affect conditional and implied volatility, b) have monotonically lower effects on volatility over the sample period, c) coincide with greater informed trading activity, and d) have mixed/weak effects on the level of daily equity returns.
V. Policy and Portfolio Management Implications
The declining responses in volatility to increases in the perceived threat of terrorist attacks 2) Does the market perceive there to be less information in the later threat level announcements? If this were the case, the probability of informed trading should decline monotonically; however, it does not. 3) Are the declining responses reflecting the move to industry-specific announcements, thereby reflecting the lower value of specific assets perceived to be at risk of attack? For this to be true, we should see changes in conditional volatility move from the broad market indexes to the industry-specific indexes upon the move to industryfocused announcements. The greater number of significant effects of industry-specific threat announcements on the AMEX Airline Index and Bloomberg NYC Regional Stock Index (albeit with mixed signs) provides some support for this concept. 4) In view of the fact that no terrorist attacks occurred in the continental U.S. after any threat level increase announcement, is it a short-sighted "cry wolf" effect? 5) Alternatively, perhaps investors are simply not able to value or understand the information the DHS is trying to convey to the public, consistent with "Knightian" uncertainty. If this is the case, the DHS needs to alter the Homeland Security Advisory System to increase transparency or the quality and quantity of the information it disseminates. Unfortunately, we will probably not know why systematic and nonsystematic risks have become less responsive until there is a successful attack following an increased threat announcement (thus allowing analysts to estimate the probabilities of successful attacks given DHS information and enabling investors to estimate expected losses).
Based on the current information contained in daily equity returns during 2001-2006, our results show that the increased volatility lasts about 10 trading days following the announcement.
Thus, investors may want to eliminate some of the increased risk, "Knightian" uncertainty or not, using index put options or other hedging techniques. This hedging activity may cost several basis points in returns during most years, but it might be well worth it in the unfortunate situation in which the DHS raises the alert level and a macro-terrorism attack occurs soon thereafter.
VI. Conclusion and Future Research
A key question investors face is how financial markets respond to sudden, large increases in uncertainty caused by factors such as the threat of terrorist activity on a global scale (also referred to as macro-terrorism). We find the conditional and implied volatility of daily U.S. equity returns to be significantly and positively related to increases in the threat of terrorist attacks. Although returns on broader stock market indexes do not always react to changes in threat levels as expected, the probability of informed trading (PIN) is consistently higher during periods of heightened threat alerts, reflecting the market's assimilation of new information from informed traders. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that the threat of terrorism can be viewed as a form of "Knightian" uncertainty, which ultimately affects both systematic and nonsystematic risks within a financial market. Although an investor may not be able to diversify away these risks fully, one can alter portfolio asset allocations or manage this increased risk via hedging techniques.
Responses to increased threat levels have also declined monotonically over the period [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] . Whether it is a case of "crying wolf" or the difficulty of assessing the financial impact of highly uncertain events such as terrorist attacks, one must consider whether these risks are being underpriced. However, an alternative argument suggests that the muted reactions to these announcements might be because the alerts are less informative in later periods. This view is consistent with the notion that more recent terror alerts are relatively uninformative because investors have already adjusted their expectations to reflect a more risky world in which terrorism risk remains heightened.
Identifying whether this decreased responsiveness to terror alerts is due to lack of credibility, possible mis-pricing, or a rational adjustment to new risks is an avenue for future research. Another topic for additional research is the identification of instruments that can forecast changes in the threat level, which in turn, would enable investors to alter asset allocations or use other risk management techniques in a more proactive manner.
Appendix Estimating the Probability of Informed Trading (PIN)
In the PIN model of Easley et al. (1996) . Nature determines whether an informational event occurs prior to the start of the trading day. Informational occurrences are assumed to be independent across trading days and occur with probability α. In the absence of an informational event, the asset value is * i V .
When an informational event occurs, the asset value is * < i i V V with probability δ and * > i i V V with probability 1-δ. That is, δ is the probability of a bad or negative informational event, and (1-δ) is the probability of a good or positive informational event. The asset value is revealed at the close of the trading day. Two groups of traders exist: informed traders and uninformed traders.
Uninformed traders trade for liquidity purposes, without knowing the underlying asset's value or if an informational event has taken place. However, informed traders know the true asset value and when informational events occur. Consequently, informed traders only trade when informational events take place.
The order-arrival processes are modeled as independent Poisson processes. The arrival rate of uninformed buy and sell orders is denoted by ε. The arrival rate of informed traders on days with information events is μ. The arrival rate of informed traders is zero on days without informational events.
Traders know the unconditional probabilities of an informational event, and they know the order arrival rates, but they do not observe whether an informational event occurred. Traders use Bayes' rule to update their beliefs during the trading day. All order-arrival rates are assumed to be independent.
At the beginning of the trading day, i.e., time zero, a market participant's beliefs about the probabilities for no news, bad news, and good news informational events are equivalent to unconditional probabilities. Formally, "no news" (n), "bad news" (b), and "good news" (g) correspond to P(0) = (1-α, αδ, α(1-δ)). Using Bayes' rule, these probabilities are updated after each trade; the vector of subjective probabilities is conditional on the trade history in the market prior to time t are denoted by P(t) = (P n (t), P b (t), P g (t)).
Because we are using daily data, each day is classified as a buy or sell day based on whether a specific daily return is positive or negative, respectively. The probability that any trade that occurs at time t is information based is the average of the probability of an informationbased sell and the probability of an information-based buy, weighted by the probability that the next transaction is buyer initiated or seller initiated. Formally,
The probability of an informed trade at the opening is based on the unconditional probabilities Easley et al. (1996) estimate the parameters: α, δ, ε, and μ for a single market. The unconditional probability of encountering an informed trader PI(0) can be determined using these parameters.
The resulting likelihood of observing S i sells and B i buys by a market maker on a no news
Equation (A3) is the product of the densities of two independent Poisson processes that determine the arrival of uninformed buyers and sellers in the two trading systems. Respectively, the likelihoods for a "bad news day" and a "good news day" are
The likelihood of observing Ω i = {S i , B i, } on a day which the occurrence of an informational event is not known is the weighted average of Equations (A3)- (A5):
Given that news events are assumed to be independent across days, the likelihood of observing the data
Equation ( *, **, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
T he values beneath the parameter estimates represent the t-statistics and the significance of these test statistics.
This table reports the estimates of conditional models of equity returns for seven indices including changes in the level of the terror alert system. Gen_Incr = 1 when there is an increase in the general threal level, otherwise it equals 0. Finl_Serv_Incr = 1 when there is an increase in the threat of a terrorist attack on financial services companies in NYC, Northern NJ, and/or Washington, DC., otherwise it equals 0. Mass_T rans_Incr = 1 when the threat of attack on mass transit assets increases, otherwise zero. Airlines_Incr =1 when the threat of attack on airlines increases. Alternatively, when threat levels decline, Gen Decr = 1, Finl Serv Decr = 1, Mass T rans Decr = 1, and Airlines Decr =1. -2098 -2097 -2097 -2101 -2078 -2079 This table reports estimates of models of market expectations of near-term volatility measured by S&P500 stock index options through the Chicago Board of Options Exchange (CBOE) Volatility Index (VIX) The variable Incr represents a time window surrounding the announcement of an increase in the terror alert status Similarly, the variable Decr represents a time window surrounding an announcement of a decrease in the threat level The time window for Incr and Decr extends from 10-days prior to an announcement to X-days preceeding an increase announcement (Lead X), or Y-Days preceeding a decrease announcment (Lead Y) Thus, Lead(X, Y) represents the number of days in the window preceeding an announcement for increases and decreases, respectively The remaining binary variables are: Incr2003, Incr2004, Incr2005, and Incr2006 = 1 if an increase in the threal level occurs in 2003, 2004, 2005, or 2006 , respectively, otherwise they equal zero Simlarly, the binaries Decr2003, Decr2004, Decr2005, and Decr2006 = 1 if the threat level decreases during 2003, 2004, 2005, or 2006 , respectively The values beneath the parameter estimates represent the t-statistics and significance of the tests
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*, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels 
Figure 4
The probability of informed trading measure (PIN) based on Easley et al. (1996) is presented below for the S&P 500 Stock Index. This graph displays PIN for various subperiods during 2002-2006 based on changes in the Department of Homeland Security's terror alert system. The legend within the graph identifies the various degrees of terrorist threats associated with each subperiod's PIN estimate.
